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PRE-PLAY RESEARCH IN A MODEL OF BANK RUNS  
 
J. DANIEL AROMÍ 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Se estudia un modelo de corrida bancaria en el que los depositantes no llegaron 
a un consenso sobre la acción a elegir pero pueden informarse acerca de las 
intenciones de los otros jugadores. La propiedad de equilibrio indeterminado 
reaparece en el juego con adquisición de información. En el escenario bajo 
análisis, el equilibrio con niveles positivos de adquisición de información 
resulta en mayores probabilidades de quiebra del banco. La correlación en las 
señales aumenta el espacio de parámetros para el cual existen equilibrios con 
niveles positivos de adquisición de información y mayor probabilidad de 
quiebra del banco. 
Clasificación JEL: C72, G21. 
Palabras Clave: Corridas bancarias, Coordinación. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We consider an extension of a bank run game assuming that depositors do not 
agree on the action to be taken but can perform research in order to learn about 
others’ initial intentions. Equilibrium indeterminacy, a characteristic of bank 
run games, re-emerges in the game with information acquisition. In the 
configuration under analysis, the equilibrium with positive levels of 
information acquisition results in higher probability of bankruptcy. 
Additionally, correlated signals enlarge the set of parameter values such that 
there exist equilibria with positive levels of information acquisition and higher 
probability of bankruptcy. 
JEL Classification: C72, G21. 
Keywords: Bank runs, Coordination. 
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PRE-PLAY RESEARCH IN A MODEL OB BANK RUNS  
 
J. DANIEL AROMÍ* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This work studies a bank run game in which players are uncertain about the 
beliefs and tentative actions of other players. This is a reasonable assumption 
in ambiguous and rare circumstances such as scenarios of potential bank runs. 
In these cases, multiple equilibria can emerge and different players might 
arrive to reasonable but different interpretations of the strategic interaction in 
which they take part. 
Given strategic uncertainty, players might engage in information 
acquisition activities. We contemplate this possibility assuming players can 
collect information about other players’ likely actions. More specifically, 
before play, they can receive a signal about the tentative play of others’.  
We are interested in establishing the effect of information acquisition on 
the equilibrium indeterminacy characteristic of bank run games. More 
specifically, we assume an information structure such play is well determined 
and evaluate whether an information acquisition stage implies multiple 
equilibria. Additionally, we are interested in describing the impact of 
information acquisition on the likelihood of successful runs.  
The game exhibits strategic complementarities in research activities. Thus, 
in general, multiplicity of equilibria cannot be ruled out in the extended model. 
We identify conditions under which equilibrium indeterminacy re-emerges in 
the game with information acquisition. With respect to the second issue, for 
the configuration under analysis, the equilibrium with positive levels of 
information acquisition results in higher probability of bankruptcy. In addition, 
we show that correlated signals enlarge the set of parameter values such that 
there exist equilibria with positive levels of information acquisition and higher 
probability of bankruptcy.  
These results have implications for the convenience of different forms of 
information transmission in circumstances of strategic uncertainty. They 
suggest that communication can be harmful and correlated messages can be 
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worse than independent messages. Additionally, these results suggest that 
multiple equilibria are a pervasive condition. In our setting, we specify beliefs 
such that optimal play for each players is determined, but indeterminacy 
reappears once the ability to collect information is contemplated. Multiple 
equilibria imply that the structure of the strategic interaction does not lead to 
an unambiguous prediction of actions selected by players.  One interpretation 
of this condition is that the theory needs to be complemented by an 
understanding of how players learn to interpret their environment. 
We believe that the insights presented in this analysis are also relevant in 
other economic interactions beyond bank runs.  In particular, in circumstances 
where there exist strategic complementarities and previous play is not 
available or is not expected to be a reliable guide for future play. A 
heterogeneous but incomplete list of examples would include: economic 
development, technology adoption, geographic location, debt crises, currency 
attacks, arbitrage in financial markets, business cycles, bargaining and pro-
social behavior.
1
 For this relevant class of settings, the usual argument of 
coordination as a result of a dynamic process of convergence does not apply. 
As a result, there is value in exploring alternative representations of the 
process that shapes behavior. 
Our contribution can be understood as one evaluation of how play can 
emerge in a context of high strategic uncertainty. In this representation we do 
not assume common knowledge of rivals’ play but assume a weaker 
assumption regarding the structure of information. We assume that beliefs 
about likely play have a common prior, difference of opinion are only the 
result of incoming signals. The weaker, but still restrictive, assumption of 
common prior beliefs can be understood as approximating situation in which, 
at a point in time, players share a common history and all players have built a 
consensus about the lessons of history and about the likely, but uncertain, 
reaction to news. Our results indicate that multiple equilibria might emerge. 
That is, even when tentative decisions are completely specified, strategic 
uncertainty reemerges when cognitive decisions are allowed. 
                                                          
1 For example see: Murphy et al. (1989) for economic development, Arthur (1999) for 
technology adoption, Avery et al. (1994) for bargaining, Abreu et al. (2002) for arbitrage, 
Cooper and John (1988) for business cycles, Rabin (1993) for pro-social behavior, Krugman 
(1991) for economics and geography, Diamond Dibvig (1983) for bank runs, Morris et al. 
(2004) for financial liquidity, Obstfeld (1996) for currency crises, Calvo (1988) for debt crises. 
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The following section presents a brief revision of related literature. Section 
3 presents the extended game. The next section analyzes the strategic 
properties of the game.  The final section presents some concluding remarks. 
 
II. Related literature 
 
This contribution is linked to a significant body of literature that studies 
events of bank runs. The seminal contribution of Diamond et al. (1983) shows 
that bank run events can be associated to circumstances of multiple equilibria. 
There exist parameter regions in which there exist an efficient equilibrium and 
an inefficient equilibrium. In the efficient equilibria deposits are renewed by 
depositors that have no liquidity needs. This behavior is in equilibrium if 
fundamentals are strong enough so that banks are able to comply with their 
contractual obligations. In the inefficient equilibria, all depositors withdraw 
their deposits, productive investment projects are liquidated in an inefficient 
manner and, in this way, the bank goes bankrupt. Withdrawing the deposit is a 
best response as long as the inefficient liquidation of investment projects 
implies sufficiently low payoff for a depositor that renews its deposit. 
The literature has been expanded in different directions. Postlewaite et al. 
(1987) show that asymmetric information can result in a unique equilibrium. 
Rochet et al. (2004) apply the global games framework
2
 to obtain a unique 
equilibrium and in this way establish connections between game parameters 
and the probability of a bank run. They focus on the value of a lender of last 
resort. Similarly, Golstein et al. (2005) apply global game techniques to obtain 
unique equilibria and analyze the desirability of demand deposit contracts. 
Green et al. (2000) and Peck et al. (2003) focus on the use of more complex 
contractual agreements and its capacity to eliminate inefficient equilibria. 
Nikitin et al. (2008) and Hasman et al. (2008) study information acquisition 
in bank run scenarios. In these studies the information to be acquired deals 
with the evaluation of projects that have been funded by banks. In contrast to 
these contributions, in our framework we focus on imperfect information 
regarding other players’ beliefs. 
                                                          
2 We provide a short description of the global games framework in the more general discussion 
of multiple equilibria in the next paragraphs.  
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An experimental analysis on bank runs has been developed by Garratt et al. 
(2009). The author assesses how the probability of a successful run depends on 
uncertainty regarding the fraction of depositor with liquidity needs and the 
number of opportunities to withdraw their deposits. Both factors are found to 
increase the probability of successful runs.  
More broadly, our analysis can also be understood as part of a series of 
more general analyses focused on the prediction of play in games with 
multiple equilibria. The presence of multiple equilibria indicates that the 
theory used to explain or predict behavior is incomplete in the sense of not 
being able to identify a unique predicted outcome. Naturally, this scenario 
stimulated analyses that try to enrich the theory in order to eliminate the 
observed incompleteness. 
One simple account postulates that there exist “sunspots” through which 
agents coordinate towards specific profiles of consistent plans. This 
explanation is not satisfactory since it amounts to ignoring or assuming away 
the strategic uncertainty that characterizes this environment. Alternatively, it 
has been argued that equilibrium is selected according to evaluations of each 
equilibrium associated levels of risk and payoff.
3
 While considerations of 
average payoffs and risk are likely to influence behavior, these arguments on 
equilibrium selection need to be accompanied by a description of the process 
through which agents agree on the valuation of different equilibria. 
In a different approach, coordination toward equilibrium has been 
explained as a result of a dynamic process in which agents learn about other’s 
likely play as they interact.
4
  These analyses typically assume a stable 
environment that allows for convergence to equilibrium. As indicated above, 
our description is focused on a different type of scenario. We focus on the case 
in which history is non-existent or not very informative.  Nevertheless, we 
envision that our insights could be informative in a dynamic analysis of action 
selection in stationary and non-stationary environments.
5
 
                                                          
3 See Harsanyi and Selten (1988) for a comprehensive presentation. 
4 See Fudenberg and Levine (1998). 
5 Explanations based on the concept of a focal point can be viewed as incorporating both 
elements of sunspots and dynamic learning.  Focal points permit predicting actions as a function 
of the shared opinions about the prominence of an option and independently of its payoffs. In 
this approach, coordination emerges as a result of reasoning about these shared opinions that are 
formed most likely through learning in repeated interactions. 
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Another strategy for tackling strategic uncertainty involves considering 
incomplete information. In this type of settings, players observe their signal 
and, given a distribution of other players’ information which is common 
knowledge, select best responses to the contingent plans of rivals which are 
predicted to be consistent. Heterogeneous private signals about payoffs can 
lead to uniqueness in the class of consistent plans in which play is conditional 
on a private signal (for the seminal contribution see Carlsson and Van Damme 
(1993) or Morris and Shin (1998) for a high impact contribution).
6
 Uniqueness 
results are based on the strong assumption of common knowledge in prior 
beliefs. In addition, under asymmetric information, uniqueness is a result of 
anchoring play through contingent plans for scenarios considered very unlikely 
once each player conditions on the private signal.  
This refinement through incomplete information has been scrutinized in 
terms of the robustness of its predictions.  For example Costain (2007) and 
Angeletos et al. (2006) show that introducing dynamic elements can result in 
the re-emergence of multiple equilibria despite the presence of asymmetric 
information. We do not explore this type of dynamic extensions of a game 
with multiple equilibria but we believe that interesting insights could result 
from the joint consideration of pre-play research stages and sequential choices 
of actions. 
The contributions focusing on communication in games with complete 
information about payoffs share characteristics with our contribution.
7
  These 
contributions typically consider situations in which two players have different 
preferences about the preferred equilibrium. Situations in which players 
communicate before playing a game with Pareto ranked equilibria or games of 
voluntary contributions have also been considered.
8
 In an enlarged game, 
messages are sent about intended play in order to coordinate play. Similarly, 
our formulation considers an enlarged game in which players learn about the 
intention of play of others. But in our formulation we have many players, there 
is no sender and learning takes the form of a noisy signal of rivals’ play that 
cannot be manipulated by a sender. In other words, our pre-game exchange of 
                                                          
6 As indicated above, Postlewaite et al.  (1987), Rochet et al. (2004) and Goldstein et al. (2005) 
are examples of models that assume asymmetric information in bank run scenarios. 
7 Farrell (1987), Rabin (1994) considers communication as a coordination device when there is 
complete information about payoffs.  
8 For a recent experimental contribution see Bochet and Putterman (2009). 
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information is unilateral, each player decides whether to extract a signal 
informative of many players’ intentions. 
The numerous and diverse contributions that tackle the challenge posed by 
multiple equilibria are suggestive of the limitations of an agenda that intends to 
impose a single criteria. In other words, in interactions with multiple consistent 
plans, there are multiple potential refinements and, as a result, strategic 
uncertainty can be rephrased as “equilibrium refinement uncertainty”. Having 
these considerations in mind, next, we analyze a setting in which there is no 
common knowledge of rivals play but information structure satisfy the milder 
but strong assumption of common priors.   
 
III. A model of bank runs with pre-play research 
 
Before introducing the information acquisition stage, we present a simple 
model of bank runs. There is a continuum of measure   of depositors that 
simultaneously choose whether to renew or withdraw their funds. The amount 
of each deposit is equal to  .  If the amount of withdrawn funds is below  , 
then the depositors that renewed their deposits earn a payoff equal to     
and those that withdrew their funds earn a return equal to 1.  If the amount of 
withdrawn funds exceeds   then the bank goes bankrupt.  In this case, the 
depositors that withdrew their funds receive a payoff equal to    ̇  and the 
payoffs for depositors that did not withdraw is  . This is a simplified version 
that does not include impatient depositors (those that need to withdraw 
independently of the likelihood of bankruptcy). In addition, we assume a very 
abrupt change in average payoffs implicitly associated with a large negative 
impact of bankruptcy on the value of the bank net assets.
9
  Finally, we are not 
describing the productive use of the funds that are borrowed by the bank. 
These simplifications are made to secure a more tractable analysis; 
qualitatively similar results would hold for versions that are closer to the 
traditional model. 
                                                          
9 Additionally, this payoff structure is a good approximation of what would be observed if the 
players in this game were junior debt holders.  In this case, the cost of the bankruptcy process 
would lead to a violent negative adjustment in their payoffs but, conditioned on bankruptcy, 
their payoffs would not change significantly with the number of withdrawals.  
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An action profile   assigns an action    *   + to each player. For a 
player  , the payoff function can be expressed as a function of the action 
selected by player  ,   , and the quantity of players selecting action  ,   : 
 
   (     )  {
                       
                      
                              
                               
 
 
It is easy to establish that, as long as   is less than  , there exist two Nash 
Equilibria involving pure strategies. In one equiilibria all players renew their 
deposits earning a payoff of     which is higher that the payoff of   
associated to selecting the alternative pure strategy.  In addition, there exists 
another equilibrium in which all depositors choose to withdraw their deposits, 
in this case their payoffs equals   which is higher than   the payoff associated 
to renewing the deposit. The first equilibrium is the payoff dominant 
equilibrium. 
We now develop a variation of these game in which aggregate behavior is 
unknown and players can acquire information. The extension involves 
assuming multiple types endowed with tentative actions and beliefs regarding 
rivals’ tentative play. In addition, there exists a pre-play stage where players 
can acquire a signal that is informative about the tentative play of other 
players.  The initial profile of tentative play is given by   . Each type of player 
is endowed with subjective beliefs defined over    given by a probability 
distribution function   ( 
 ). We assume that each player tentative action and 
subjective beliefs are consistent in the sense that   
  maximizes expected 
payoffs when the action profile is believed to satisfy   ( 
 ). That is, as long as 
beliefs imply that the optimal action is unique, a type is completely determined 
by its beliefs.  Taking the tentative play and beliefs associated to tentative play 
as given, we present a game in which agents can acquire information and 
revise its tentative play. 
Research activities are developed simultaneously. In this pre-play stage, 
each player sets the level for an activity that increases its information about 
rival’s tentative play.  Let    *   + represent the level of this research 
activity. In order to distinguish this activity from the action in the second 
stage, we will use the expression “research action” to refer to the choice of   .  
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If      , player   will receive a message   *   +, a noisy signal about the 
tentative action profile   . The signal is   with probability equal to the 
fraction of players tentatively selecting   and the signal is   with probability 
equal to the fraction of players tentatively selecting  .  We assume that no 
signal is received if there is no research. We will denote this event by     . 
Research activity is potentially costly and is associated to a negative impact on 
payoffs equal to    . Let   be the profile of research action and    be the 
“post-research” profile of withdrawal or renewal decisions. After the research 
stage, each player forms beliefs about action profile    and chooses action 
  
  *   +. 
As a result, this version of the model is a game with asymmetric 
information where each agent has a type determined by its tentative action and 
the beliefs regarding others’ tentative action. Each player makes two decisions. 
The first action is given by a level of research activity,    *   +. After 
making this decision and updating beliefs, the choice between renewing the 
deposit or withdrawing the funds is made,   
  *   +. Let   
  be the fraction 
of players that, under profile   , select  .  Then, the payoff function of player 
  is given by:   (  
    
    )    (  
    
 )      where   ( ) is the payoff 
function of the original game.  
The research activity described above is a very specific form of information 
acquisition. In general, information acquisition can involve many different 
practices including word of mouth communication
10
, attending to mass media 
content
11
 or analyzing statistical information. The specification in our model 
seems to be closer to the case of word of mouth communication in a case in 
which the sender does not act strategically and the matching between subjects 
is random. The cost   of research activities can be associated to the 
opportunity cost of the cognitive resources allocated to this activity. 
As indicated earlier, we assume learning activities are simultaneous. In our 
simple representation, all agents observe a signal of the same profile of 
tentative play. A more realistic representation would allow for sequential, but 
still unobserved, learning activities in which agents observe signals 
corresponding to different profiles of tentative play as research leads to 
                                                          
10 For studies of word of mouth communication see for example Banerjee et al. (2004) and Cao 
(2011). 
11 See for example Veldkamp (2006) and Tetlock (2007) for studies of the impact of information 
spread through media outlets. 
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changes in intentions. In this setting, players choosing to perform learning 
activities would benefit from being the last to get a signal of the tentative 
profile. This is because agents are interested in what other players will do, 
there is no intrinsic value in learning about what others’ think. Our 
simultaneity assumption avoids the difficulties that arise from these 
asymmetries. At the same time, numerical simulations indicate that the 
quantitative differences of introducing sequential learning are relatively low.
12
  
Before proceeding to the analysis of strategic properties of the game we 
would like to make an observation on spillovers in this game. We find that the 
welfare impact of research on others depends on the tentatively selected action 
of the player performing this activity. The spillover is negative in the case of 
players that have tentatively chosen to renew the deposit.  This is because the 
number of players that withdraw their deposits can only increase as players 
with tentative play   perform research activities that can change their 
tentatively selected action.  This results in negative externalities as, for a fixed 
distribution of other players’ actions, the probability of bankruptcy increases.  
On the other hand, through a similar reasoning, we can verify that research by 
agents that have tentatively selected   leads to positive externalities. 
 
IV.  Equilibrium analysis 
 
In this subsection we analyze equilibria of this game under the assumption 
of common prior beliefs. That is, we allow for differences of opinion but we 
assume that players’ differences of opinion are only explained by differences 
in the information perceived. In this way, we select a specific information 
structure and, given these setup, we perform equilibrium analysis of the game 
that includes a stage of information acquisition. In the following subsection we 
specify the initial information structure. Next, we analyze equilibrium 
properties of the game. The last subsection presents a modified version of the 
game in which signals are correlated. 
Before developing the analysis, it is convenient to make some remarks 
regarding the solution concepts. More specifically, in this work we allow for 
inconsistent behavior regarding financial decisions but we solve for an 
                                                          
12 It is worth noting, in contrast to the case of sequential research considered in this paragraph, 
sequential renewal or withdrawal decisions would lead to important consequences in play 
(Costein, 2007).  
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equilibrium in which information acquisition decisions are consistent. First, 
the analysis can be understood as an exploration of the likely behavior that 
might emerge under heterogeneous levels of belief coordination. More 
specifically, actors might have problems predicting beliefs in specific 
scenarios but they might be able to coordinate beliefs regarding how optimism 
or pessimism leads to information acquisition. For example, this would be the 
case if financial decisions depend on complex perception problems that resolve 
ambiguity while information acquisition is coordinated though some simple 
focal public signal. 
From a different perspective, the exercise can be understood as an 
exploration in which the existence of multiple equilibria in the information 
acquisition stage is evaluated. If multiple equilibria are found then, it is 
established that the context is ambiguous, the coordination of decisions might 
not be achieved and path dependence is quite relevant. These are important 
messages that emerge from an equilibrium analysis. While both perspectives 
are admissible, we would tend to focus on this second view. 
 
IV.1.  The basic bank run game and its initial information structure 
 
The analysis below will be carried out assuming parameter values that 
satisfy certain conditions that are specified at this stage. We assume     
    ⁄ , that is, the ability of the bank to withstand liquidity shocks is 
moderately high. We also impose conditions on the payoffs associated to each 
outcome. We assume           , that is, it is established that the interest 
rate is not too large or too small compared to the recovery rate under bank 
failure. The structure of information described above is consistent given the 
structure of parameter described in this paragraph.  
We assume that there exist two types of players, a pessimistic type   and an 
optimistic type  . The tentative action of a pessimistic type is “withdraw” and 
the tentative action of an optimistic type is “renew”. Given the information 
structure described below, these tentative actions are shown to be best 
responses to subjective beliefs. Each type is also characterized by a probability 
distribution function    with domain ,   -. This distribution    constitutes the 
subjective beliefs of type    with respect to the frequency of types, that is 
  ( )      (    ). Nature selects with equal probability a frequency   
from a set of feasible frequencies  . Given the common prior assumption, the 
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beliefs of each type must satisfy the condition that these beliefs are equal to the 
updated beliefs of an agent that knows the process through which nature 
selects frequencies and is informed about its type. 
 We will propose and work with one specification that satisfies this 
condition. Nature selects with equal probability among four possible 
frequencies or states: pessimistic ( ), medium-pessimistic (  ), medium 
optimistic (  ) and optimistic ( ). The proportion of pessimistic agents are 
4/5, 3/5, 2/5 and 1/5 respectively. The common prior assumption is that each 
agent knows this process.  
At this point, it is convenient to make some remarks about the structure of 
information. The different states selected by nature can be interpreted as 
aggregate variations in the level of confidence that is controlled by complex 
processes that each agent is unable to understand. The idea is that there are 
many details that can affect the way in which the ambiguity presented by a 
specific concrete scenario is resolved by the perceptual system. These 
resolutions determine the proportion of optimistic players and pessimistic 
players. On the other hand, it is assumed that the agents share beliefs regarding 
the likelihood of each state. This coincidence in prior beliefs can be considered 
to be the long run result of shared experience in, or shared knowledge about, 
different but similar scenarios.  
Beliefs are updated through Bayes’ rule after an agent is informed about its 
type. For example, after receiving a message indicating a pessimistic type, 
updated beliefs regarding the probability of state   satisfies: 
 
   (   |    )  
   (   )   (    |   )
   (    )
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
Similar calculations show that according to updated beliefs states  ,  P, 
   and   are assigned probabilities 2/5, 3/10, 1/5 and 1/10 respectively. For 
the case of an agent with an optimistic type the updated beliefs are such that 
states  ,       and   are assigned probabilities 1/10, 1/5, 3/10 and 2/5 
respectively. 
Absent any innovation to information sets, a pessimistic type will find it 
optimal to withdraw the deposit if:  
 
 ,  (    )|    -   ,  (    )|    - 
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   (   |    )   ,     (   |    )-   ,     (   |    )-(   ) 
         (   )    
       
 
Similarly, it can be shown that an optimistic agent will find that   is a best 
response as long as      . That is, the tentative action if each type is 
consistent with its beliefs. This set up can be understood as a form of 
correlated equilibrium in which there behavior and beliefs are coordinated 
through aggregate shocks.  
As indicated below, the parameter restrictions imply a scenario in which 
fundamentals are relatively strong and agents are sufficiently optimistic on 
average so that, absent information acquisition, bankruptcy would occur with 
probability    , that is, only in state  . Additionally, the parameter 
configuration imposes intermediate values of   and   so that, without 
information acquisition, pessimistic and optimistic players select different 
actions.  
The information structure rules out the strong assumption of common 
knowledge regarding behavior and imposes a milder, but still strong, form of 
information coordination. The lack of consensus is only due to the arrival of 
new signals that determine the type of each player. This scenario can be 
interpreted as a situation in which, up to a specific point in time, all players 
share a common history and all players have built a consensus about the 
lessons of history. In addition, all agents know that the consensus is broken by 
the arrival of information that results in different types endowed with different 
beliefs. In this way, the consensus is partially broken, but in an orderly 
fashion. 
Given this information structure and the game payoffs, in the absence of 
information acquisition, the behavior in this game is completely specified and 
optimal given beliefs. A pessimistic type selects “withdraw” and an optimistic 
type selects “renew”. These are the best responses given their correct 
information about the beliefs of each type and their imperfect information 
regarding the proportion of players of each type. Bankruptcy occurs only in 
state  .  
Our analysis focuses on the changes associated to allowing players to 
acquire information regarding likely play. In particular, we ask whether the 
equilibrium indeterminacy reemerges as a consequence of introducing an 
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option to learn about others’ information sets. Additionally we are interested in 
describing the impact of information acquisition on the outcomes of the game. 
 
IV.2.  Equilibrium analysis with information acquisition 
 
Turning back to the game with a research stage, we would like to define an 
equilibrium. A strategy involves the selection of a research decision for each 
type of agent. Formally, a strategy is a contingent plan 
  **  +     *   +          + where    *   + is the research decision 
made by an agent of type    *   + and     *   + is the decision made by an 
agent of type   *   + that receives message   *     +. It is assumed that, 
conditioned on the state selected by Nature, the signal received by players 
acquiring information is independent across players. The analysis will focus on 
symmetric equilibrium, that is, one in which each agent with the same type or 
information set selects the same action.  
 
Definition: 
A symmetric equilibrium of the bank run game with information 
acquisition is given by a strategy    such that: 
 
   
        
  *   +
 ,  (    )|      
 -                          
 
  
        
  *   +
 (      
 )               
 
Where    is the random fraction of players selecting   under  
  and  
 (       )   , ,  (   
    )|      
 -| - is the expected payoff for a player 
with type    when its research decision is   and all other choices in decision 
nodes (own and others’) are as prescribed by   . 
Equilibrium involves the usual optimality conditions. In addition, the 
expectation operators indicate the presence of belief updating. The following 
lemma identifies the conditions under which there exist an equilibrium with no 
research activity. 
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Lemma 1: 
There exists an equilibrium path involving no research activity by any type 
as long as       {
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
 }. 
 
Proof: 
If no research is carried out then, beliefs regarding other’s beliefs are not 
modified with respect to the initial profile, hence optimal decision making 
requires that, in the equilibrium path, optimistic players select action   and 
pessimistic players select action  . Additionally, the best response of an 
optimistic (pessimistic) player that receives signal   ( ) is given by   ( ). 
This is simply because these messages only strengthen the initial inclination of 
each type. Hence, the candidate equilibrium strategy is given by    
{           
         
 }  Note that two elements in the contingent plan are not 
determined yet, this is because the optimal action in each of those situations 
depends on parameter conditions that are analyzed below. The analysis will 
consider two cases. 
If 
 
 
 
 
 
 only players with type   would benefit from a deviation. This is 
because after receiving    an optimistic agent believes that the probability 
of frequency P is 1/5 and, given these assessment, it is easy to verify that the 
optimal action is renewing the deposit if: 
 
 
 
(   )  
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then, in this case, information has no value for an optimistic agent since it 
does not lead to changes in decision making. On the other hand, a pessimistic 
agent that perceives    would assign a probability of 1/5 to the event of 
bankruptcy. Again, in this case, selecting   is optimal. The value of 
information for this type is positive since it results, ex ante, in better decision 
making. The value of information is equal to the difference between the 
expected payoff when information is acquired and the payoff with no research 
activity. With no research activity the payoff is equal to: 
 
 (      )  (    ( |    ))     ( |    ) 
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 (      )  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
With research activity, the payoff is a function not only of the frequency of 
different type of players but also of the message perceived and the associated 
action selected: 
  (      )             ( |    ) ,  (   | ) -      
   (  |    ) ,  (   |  )                                          
 (   )  (   |  )-
   (  |    ) ,  (   |  )  (   )   (   |  )-
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The value of information is given by: 
 
 (      )   (      )  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
Then, for 
 
 
 
 
 
, as long as   is larger then or equal to the expression above, 
setting     is an optimal action. 
For the case  
 
 
 
 
 
, a similar analysis indicates that the optimistic type is 
the only one that assigns a positive value to the signal. The value of the signal 
can be shown to equal: 
 
 (      )   (      )  
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Then, for the case 
 
 
 
 
 
, as long as   is larger or equal than the expression 
above, setting     is an optimal action. □ 
 
This lemma indicates that, for any value for parameter  , there is an 
equilibrium without information acquisition as long as the parameters   and   
are not too far away and the cost of information acquisition is sufficiently high. 
If this cost is too low, it will be the case that one type of player will find it 
optimal to deviate and acquire information. The cost parameter is compared 
against the value of information of the type of player that, as a function of 
payoff parameters, is the one that assigns the highest value to information.  
It must be noted that the value of information is endogenous, that is, it 
depends on the decisions made by other agents. The way in which the value of 
information varies with information acquisition decisions is the key property 
that will determine the existence of multiple equilibria. The next lemma 
evaluates the conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibria with positive 
levels of research activity by optimistic agents. 
  
Lemma 2: 
There exists an equilibrium path involving research activity by optimistic 
types only as long as 
 
 
    and       {
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 }. 
 
Proof: 
In the corresponding equilibrium path, pessimistic agents do not perform 
research activities and select action  . This is because their beliefs regarding 
the proportion of each type does not change and they anticipate some 
optimistic might change their mind. Additionally, for optimistic agents to 
perform costly research activities in equilibrium, it must be the case that the 
resulting information should be valuable. In other words, the optimal choice of 
action in the second stage must be   if the message is   and must equal   if 
the message is  . This implies changes in the frequencies of players choosing 
to withdraw their funds with respect to the original frequencies determined by 
the fraction of players of each type. In particular, under state   , there are 2/5 
of optimistic players receiving signal  . This implies that after research 
activities are performed, the fraction of players selecting   is equal to the 
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fraction of pessimistic agents plus the fraction of optimistic players times the 
probability of receiving message  . It is easy to check that the number is 
higher than 4/5. This implies that, under the postulated parameter values, 
bankruptcy will be observed under state MP. In states O, MO and P, the 
fraction of players selecting   is also higher than the number of pessimistic 
types but there is no impact in the payoffs resulting from each action. 
Now, given that states MP and P result in bankruptcy, the assessed 
probability of bankruptcy by an optimistic player that did not receive a 
message is 
 
  
 
 
 
     . Given the assumption on the parameter values, this 
implies that given this information set,   is an optimal action as long as 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
In this way, for 
 
 
 
 
 
, the candidate equilibrium strategy satisfies:    
*           
       +. 
The expected utility for an optimistic player that does not acquire 
information is: 
 
 (      )    (      |    ) (   ) 
 
 (      )  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
Applying Bayes’ rule, it can be verified that after an optimistic type 
receives message  , the resulting subjective probability of bankruptcy is equal 
to 1/6. Similarly, after an optimistic type receives message  , the resulting 
subjective probability of default equals 1/2. Using this information, some 
simple algebra shows that the postulated second stage actions for an optimistic 
agent that acquires information are optimal as long as 
 
 
 
 
 
  . These two 
conditions are satisfied for the range of parameter values considered in this 
case. Additionally, as long as 
 
 
   a pessimistic type that receives message   
would still find that   is the optimal second stage actions and, hence, the play 
is no contingent on the signal, that is, the signal has no value. 
The expected utility for an optimistic player that acquires information is: 
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The value of information is given by: 
 
 (      )   (      )  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
Hence, for 
 
 
 
 
 
,    is an equilibrium as long as the value of information is 
higher than  . 
For the case  
 
 
 
 
 
 , an optimistic that does not acquire information finds 
that the optimal action in the second stage is  . This alters the value of 
information since, for this case, the expected utility of an optimistic agent that 
does not acquire information equals: 
 
 (      )    (      |    )  (    (      |    ))  
 
 (      )  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
Since the utility associated to collecting information is the same as in the 
previous case, we have that the value of information is given by: 
 
 (      )   (      )  
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Hence, for 
 
 
 
 
 
,    is an equilibrium as long as the value of information 
expressed above is higher than  . The lemma results from combining the 
conditions of the two cases under consideration. □ 
 
Hence, for this type of equilibria to exist, the gains from placing a deposit 
in a good state need to be sufficiently high and the cost of information needs to 
be sufficiently low compared to the value of information. The condition for 
equilibrium reflects that the value of information takes two different forms 
depending on the preferred action by an optimistic player that does not collect 
information but knows that other optimistic players are collecting information.   
Given the result of lemma 1, it is of interest to check the conditions such 
that there exist values of the cost parameter that allow for multiple equilibria. 
This is the case when the lower bound on   impose by lemma 1 is below the 
upper bound required by lemma 2. The following proposition shows that the 
value of information is these scenarios changes in a way such that multiple 
equilibria can re-emerge for an ample set of the original game payoff 
parameters. 
 
Proposition 1: 
For   
 
 
    
 
 
 , there exist a nonempty range of values for   such that 
the game has both an equilibrium with no acquisition of information and an 
equilibrium in which optimistic types acquire information. 
 
Proof: 
Three cases must be considered since different conditions operate in each 
case. First, for 
 
 
    
 
 
 , there is an equilibrium with no information 
acquisition as long as      
 
  
  
 
  
  and there is an equilibrium in which 
optimistic players acquire information if      
 
 
  
 
  
 . It is easy to 
verify that, for this case,       then, there exist a nonempty set of values for 
  such that both equilibria exist. Next, for 
 
 
    
 
 
 , there is an 
equilibrium with no information acquisition as long as      
 
  
  
 
  
  
and there is an equilibrium in which optimistic players acquire information if 
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 . It can be shown that for this case,      , there exist a 
nonempty set of values for   such that both equilibria exist. Finally, for  
 
 
    
 
 
 , there is an equilibrium with no information acquisition as long 
as      
 
  
  
 
  
  and there is an equilibrium in which optimistic players 
acquire information if      
 
 
  
 
 
 . Again, since      , there exist a 
nonempty set of values for   such that both equilibria exist. □ 
This result shows that allowing for acquisition of information regarding 
other beliefs, reintroduces equilibrium indeterminacy commonly observed in 
analysis of bank run scenarios. In addition, it is shown that information 
acquisition can increase the probability of a successful run. If optimistic 
players acquire information, bankruptcy will be observed not only in the 
“pessimistic” state but also in the “medium pessimistic” state. This implies 
that, for the scenario under analysis, information acquisition can have harmful 
effects and a raise in the cost associated to this activity can have beneficial 
effects. 
We provide results on the existence of equilibria in which pessimistic types 
acquire information. First, it is shown that, in this set up, strategic 
complementarities are not sufficiently strong so that both types of players 
acquire information in equilibrium. Second, it is shown that for sufficiently 
strong fundamentals there is no equilibrium in which pessimistic types acquire 
information. 
 
Proposition 2: 
With costly information, there are no symmetric equlibria involving 
information acquisition by both types of players. Additionally, if        , 
there are no symmetric equilibria in which only pessimistic types acquire 
information. 
 
Proof: 
There are no symmetric equilibria in which pessimistic and optimistic types 
do research. Note that if all players do research it needs to be the case that the 
information is valuable for all. That is, all players select the action indicated by 
the message. It is easy to show that the updated beliefs of a pessimistic type 
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that receives message   and an optimistic type that receives message   are the 
same. But in equilibrium their actions must be different. For that to be optimal, 
it must be the case that the expected payoffs associated to each action coincide. 
But then, information is not valuable and information acquisition by both types 
cannot be an equilibrium. 
Finally, for        , research by pessimistic type cannot be an 
equilibrium. Note that if pessimistic types do research then, it should be the 
case and research is valuable and, in the equilibrium path, second stage action 
selection coincides with the message perceived. Then, in state       of the 
pessimistic types receive message   and, as a result, choose   in the second 
stage. Hence, in this state, the fraction of agents that select   is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
and no bankruptcy occurs in the equilibrium path. Then, there is no value of 
information. □ 
 
An equilibrium in which pessimistic players acquire information does not 
exist for an ample subset of the values of the parameter   that controls the 
threshold of withdrawals above which the bankruptcy occurs. This is because 
the fraction of pessimistic players that would receive signal   and, as a 
consequence, would find it optimal to select “renew” is such that, for a 
relatively high value of  , bankruptcy would not occur in any state. Naturally, 
for sufficiently low levels of   an equilibrium in which pessimistic players 
acquire information is not ruled out. 
The previous proposition indicates that strategic complementarities in 
information acquisition are not strong enough so that there exists an 
equilibrium in which all players acquire information. The next section 
considers a change in the technology of information acquisition such that this 
type of equilibrium can exist. 
 
IV.3.  Prominent player 
 
So far we have assumed that, once we condition on the state, the 
information acquired is not correlated. But, given the initial information 
structure, the set of equilibria and the outcome of the game could be different 
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under different properties of acquired information. For example, the diversity 
in the information acquired, can be influenced by the shape of the network 
through which information is channeled. In this subsection we consider a 
scenario in which signals are highly correlated. More specifically, we assume 
that the signal observed by all players that acquire information, equals the 
tentative action of a “prominent” player that is selected with equal probability 
among all players participating in the game. This is an extreme situation in 
which the diversity in the content of signals is driven to a minimum. We use 
this case to illustrate the impact of changes of technology of information 
transmission on the incentives to acquire information and the associated 
equilibria of the game. 
 
Proposition 3: 
With perfectly correlated signals and   
 
 
 , there exist an equilibrium in 
which all players acquire information.  Additionally, if   
  
  
    
  
  
  there 
exists an equilibrium in which optimistic players acquire information. 
 
Proof: 
Under perfect correlation of the signal, when all players acquire 
information, the assessed probability of bankruptcy is equal to the probability 
that the signal is  , which is equal to the proportion of pessimistic players. 
This proportion can be computed as the sum of the probability of each state 
times the proportion of pessimistic players in each state. Straightforward 
computations show that for a pessimistic player this number equals     and 
for an optimistic player this number equals 2/3. Then, as a consequence of the 
perfect coordination when all players acquire information, the expected payoff 
for an optimistic type is 
 
 
  
 
 
(   ) and the expected payoff for a 
pessimistic type is 
 
 
  
 
 
(   ). The value of information is given by the 
difference between these expected payoffs and the expected payoffs when no 
information is acquired. As long as 
 
 
 
 
 
, a player that does not acquire 
information (optimistic or pessimistic) finds it optimal to choose “withdraw”. 
Hence the expected payoffs are 
 
 
 
 
 
  for an optimistic type and 
 
 
 
 
 
  for a 
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pessimistic type and the value of information is 
 
 
  for an optimistic type and 
 
 
  for a pessimistic type. Note that, since the default action is “withdraw”, the 
value of information is lower for the pessimistic type. Then, there exist an 
equilibrium in which all players acquire information as long as   
 
 
 . 
Under perfect correlation of the signal, when optimistic players acquire 
information, the assessed probability of bankruptcy is equal to the probability 
that the signal is  , which is equal to the proportion of pessimistic players. 
This proportion can be computed as the sum of the probability of each state 
times the proportion of pessimistic players in each state. Straightforward 
computations show that for an optimistic player this number equals      . 
Then, as a consequence of the perfect coordination when all players acquire 
information, the expected payoff for an optimistic type is 
  
  
  
  
  
(   ). 
The value of information is given by the difference between these expected 
payoffs and the expected payoffs when no information is acquired. As long as 
 
 
 
 
 
, a player that does not acquire information (optimistic or pessimistic) 
finds it optimal to choose “withdraw”. Hence the expected payoffs are 
  
  
 
  
  
  for an optimistic type. Then, an optimistic type finds it optimal to 
acquire information if   
  
  
 . Similar calculations show that, in this case, a 
pessimistic type would find that not acquiring information is a best response as 
long as   
  
  
 . □ 
 
As in the case in which signals are not correlated, equilibria with 
information acquisition are associated to a probability of default that is higher 
than the probability of default in the case in which no information is acquired. 
Also we can verify, that under correlated signals, these type of equilibria exist 
under weaker assumptions.  
 
Corollary 1: 
Under perfectly correlated signals, the range of parameter such that there 
exists an equilibrium in which optimistic players acquire information is larger 
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than the corresponding range of parameters of the game with independent 
signals.  
 
Proof: 
In the proof of Proposition 3, it is shown that as long as   
  
  
  there 
exists and equilibrium in which optimistic players acquire information. This 
condition on the parameters can be shown to be weaker that the conditions 
required for this type of equilibrium in the case in which signals are 
independent. Note that for   
 
 
 , lemma 2 requires   
 
 
  
 
  
  which is 
smaller than the upper bound of proposition 3. In addition, for   
 
 
 , the 
condition of lemma 2 is   
 
 
  
 
 
 . Replacing   by the smaller number  
 
 
 , 
we get    
 
 
.
 
 
 /  
 
 
  
 
  
  which results in another upper bound that is 
smaller than the upper bound from proposition 3. □ 
The scenario under analysis constitutes one instance in which easier 
coordination through correlated information implies that worse equilibrium 
outcomes are possible. This result has implications not only about the 
desirability of information transmission but also about the convenience of 
different technologies of information transmission. 
The following proposition establishes the result on equilibrium 
indeterminacy for the case of correlated signals. 
 
Proposition 4: 
With perfectly correlated signals there always exists a nonempty range of 
values ,     - such that if   belongs to that range, there exist an equilibrium in 
which all players acquire information and an equilibrium in which no player 
acquires information. 
 
Proof: 
The conditions for an equilibrium in which no player acquires information 
are the same as in the original game. This is because if no player acquires 
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information, the correlation in the signals does not have an impact on the 
relative payoffs of an agent that is assessing the benefits of acquiring 
information. As shown in lemma 1, for 
 
 
 
 
 
 the condition for this type of 
equilibrium is   
 
  
  
 
  
  and for 
 
 
 
 
 
 the condition for this type of 
equilibrium is   
 
  
  
 
  
 . 
We need to consider conditions such that both equilibria exist. Remember 
that in proposition 3, we verified that there is an equilibrium in which all 
players acquire information as long as   
 
 
 . For 
 
 
 
 
 
, the conditions that 
must be satisfied for the existence of both equilibria are      
 
  
  
 
  
  
and      
 
 
 . Since the initial parameter restrictions includes 
 
 
 
 
 
, it can 
be shown that      . For   
 
 
 
 
 
, the conditions that must be satisfied for the 
existence of both equilibria are      
 
  
  
 
  
  and      
 
 
 . Since 
the initial parameter restrictions includes 
 
 
 
 
 
, it can be shown that      . 
Hence, in both cases there exist values for parameter   such that both types of 
equilibria exist. □ 
 
V.  Concluding remarks 
 
We have analyzed a simple game of bank runs. We have argued that, for 
first-play type of situations insights can be gained by considering a scenario in 
which players have a tentative action profile where actions are non-consistent 
and can be revised by performing activities that permit learning about others’ 
tentative play. We identify conditions under which equilibrium indeterminacy 
re-emerges in the game with information acquisition. With respect to the 
second issue, for the configuration under analysis, the equilibrium with 
positive levels of information acquisition results in higher probability of 
bankruptcy. In addition, we show that correlated signals enlarge the set of 
parameter values such that there exist equilibria with positive levels of 
information acquisition and higher probability of bankruptcy. These results 
have implications for the convenience of different forms of information 
transmission in circumstances of strategic uncertainty. They suggest that 
 SEGMENTATION AND MOBILITY OF WOMEN …                         83  
communication can be harmful and correlated messages can be worse than 
independent messages. 
This analysis naturally demands empirical exercises to evaluate the fitness 
of different predictions. Experiments seem to be the most natural environment 
where coordination and research efforts by participants playing the game on a 
first occasion can be evaluated. 
Another direction in which our analysis can be further developed has to do 
with exploring richer dynamics. Throughout this work we have emphasized 
that first-play type of situations is the environment that we have in mind. But 
the approach we have developed could be evaluated jointly with adaptive 
learning assumptions. Non-stationary conditions in particular contexts of 
repeated interaction where payoffs can change abruptly are definitely other 
settings where perspectives similar to the ones we developed in this work 
could be applied. 
Finally, two other areas in which this type of analysis can be further 
developed are the consideration of public signals and diversity in the level of 
sophistication of players. Public signals can play an important role in 
facilitating coordination. We have partly addressed this issue by allowing 
correlation in the research signals. Regarding levels of sophistication, we have 
assumed that all players use a similar type of simple rule to select actions. 
More sophisticated rules would involve further inferences regarding the value 
of an action given the rules used by other players. We could consider a 
situation in which cognitively constrained agents have to choose between 
allocating resources to inner deliberations or to research about others’ 
intention. 
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